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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUME XXXVIII FEBRUARY, 1932 NummB 2
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR TORT IN WEST
VIRGINIA
T. BROOKE PRICE'
Any attempt to analyze the West Virginia decisions upon
the tort liability of governmental bodies and officials reveals a
tangle of common law principles, statutory provisions and consti-
tutional doctrines. The inter-action of these various elements has
produced a mass of cases which fall into a number of groups.
The cases in each group are reasonably consistent with each other,
but difficult to coordinate with those in other groups. It is a
growing field of the law, dealing with problems of increasing im-
portance to property owners and the public at large. New and
troublesome questions frequently arise, and the search for sound
principles and analogies to apply to them has not always been
highly successful. A classification of the decisions and some
analysis of the underlying principles may be helpful.
Before entering the special field of tort, one general doctrine
must be examined. It is a basic principle of our system of juris-
prudence that the state, by reason of its sovereign character, can-
not be sued without its own consent. In West Virginia the con-
stitution provides that the state shall never be made defendant
in any court of law or equity.' How far this provision modifies
the general common law principle is an interesting subject for
speculation which has not been discussed in the decisions. At any
rate, it is clear that there is a general immunity from suit apply-
ing to state officials;' to state boards, commissions and similar
* Member of the Bar, Charleston, West Virginia.
1W W. Va. Const., art. 6, § 35.
'See Blue Jacket Consolidated Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S.
E. 514 (1901).
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agencies of a governmental character ;' to counties as governmental
or administrative sub-divisions of the state;' and to cities, towns,
boards of education, and all municipal corporations or quasi-cor-
porations in so far, and so far only, as they are engaged in activ-
ities of a governmental character.'
This immunity from suit from its very nature does not de-
pend upon the character of the claim asserted. As against the
state and its direct and immediate agencies, actions based upon
contract are precluded as effectively as those sounding in tort.*
sIn the following cases certain state boards, commissions and agencies
were held exempt from suit under the circumstances indicated: Sayre v.
Northwestern Road, 10 Leigh 454 (Va. 1839) (an early public improvement
company, chartered for the construction of a highway,-consequential liability
for negligence); Miller v. State Board of Agriculture, 46 W. Va. 192, 32 S.
E. 1007 (1899) (the State Board of Agriculture--attempt to enforce a con-
tract by mandamus); Miller Supply Company v. State Board of Control, 72
W. Va. 524, 78 S. E. 672 (1913) (the State Board of Control, holding and
managing state institutions,--action of contract); Gordon v. State Board of
Control, 85 W. Va. 739, 102 S. E. 688 (the same board,--attempt to enforce
a contract by mandamus); Barber's Adm'r. v. Spencer State Hospital, 95
W. Va. 463, 121 S. E. 497 (1914) (the same board,--tort claim for wrong-
ful death); Mahone v. State Road Commission, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S. E.
320 (1925) (the State Road Commission,--tort claim for damage to real
estate); Lambert v. County Court, 103 W. Va. 37, 136 S. E. 507 (1927).
But by reason of the terms of the special acts under which they were in-
corporated, the" following agencies which claimed to represent the state were
held liable to suit: Dunnington v. Northwestern Road, 6 Gratt. 160 (Va.
1849) (an internal improvement company, chartered for the construction of
a highway,--action upon contract directly involved in enterprise); James
River & Kanawha Company v. Early, 13 Gratt. 541 (Va. 1856) (a company
in which the state was a stockholder, organized for the improvement of
river navigation,-action for negligence in leaving a snag in the river);
Tompkins v. Kanawha Board, 19 W. Va. 257, 21 W. Va. 224 (1882) (a
similar board, chartered to improve river navigation--action for negligence
in leaving an obstruction in the river).
,'See Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657, 5 S. E. 654 (1888); Ship-
ley v. Jefferson County, 72 W. Va. 656, 659, 78 S. E. 792 (1913); Corrigan
v. Board of Commissioners, 74 W. Va. 89, 81 S. E. 566 (1914); Rader v.
County Court, 94 W. Va. 493, 119 S. E. 479 (1923); Douglass v. County
Court, 90 W. Va. 47, 110 S. E. 439 (1922).
See the cases listed infra n. 8. Early Virginia cases, particularly Dun-
nington v. Northwestern Road, supra n. 3, discuss extensively the Eng-
lish cases upon the liability of commissioners for constructing public im-
provements under special acts of Parliament. See Plate Manufacturers v.
Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Boulton v. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703 (1824); Sutton
v. Clark, 6 Taunt. 29 (1815). These are treated as though they were author-
ities that the defendants were immune from suit as representatives of the
sovereign. In fact, the cases seem to go no further than to hold that the
commissioners were not liable for damages necessarily incurred in properly
performing what was directed by Parliament; but that they might be liable
if they acted wantonly or even negligently. This seems at most to be a
doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament and cannot be readily fitted in
with the usual principle applied by American courts.8 Miller v. State Board of Agriculture, 46 W. Va. 192, 32 S. E. 1007 (1899);
Miller Supply Co. v. State Board of Control, supra n. 3; Gordon v. State
Board of Control, supra n. 3.
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However, upon descending into the lower forms of governmental
organizations, we find a marked difference in attitude toward the
two classes of claims. Counties, boards of education, towns and
cities are usually sued as a matter of course upon their contractual
obligations, and only in tort actions is the familiar defense as-
serted that the defendant is an agency of the government and
immune from suit. By statute and by charter, these subordinate
governmental agencies have in general been vested with powers
and duties of such character that the courts, almost without dis-
cussion, have found consent on the part of the state to the judicial
enforcement of their contractual obligations even in governmental
matters.' In the field of tort, however, no such consent has been
given, and the right to sue depends upon the question whether
the tort was committed within or without the field of govern-
mental administration. It is obvious that the sitliations in which
tort liability can be enforced must lie within a very limited com-
pass.
Just what activities of municipal corporations are govern-
mental, and what tests shall be applied in fixing the boundaries
of this field, are familiar questions discussed by a multitude of
legal authorities. The West Virginia cases are grouped in a foot-
note.8 While not wholly consistent, the cases follow the generally
7See generally as to the status of county courts and their liability to suit,
W. VA. Ray. CODE (1931) c. 7, art. 1, § 1 and art. 5, §§ 8, 9; Exchange Bank
of W. Va. v. Lewis County, 28 W. Va. 273, 286 (1886); County Court v.
Holt, 53 W. Va. 532, 44 S. E. 887 (1903). Upon the same matters relating
to boards of education, see W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 18, art. 5, § 5;
Eakle v. Board of Education, 97 W. Va. 434, 439, 125 S. E. 165 (1924).
8 The difficulty of analyzing the cases of this class is increased by con-
fusion in many of the opinions between (a) the governmental immunity from
suit here discussed and (b) the absence of liability deduced from the doc-
trine that defaults of public officials or agents are not chargeable to the
government,--a wholly different principle considered hereafter. It is virtual-
ly impossible to say how far the court in many cases is invoking one rule or
the other, and consequently the pertinent cases have been collected and cited
here, although many are equally applicable to the later discussion.
The following activities of municipalities have been held to be of govern-
mental character: Richmond v. Long's Adm'r., 17 Gratt. 375 (Va. 1867)
(maintaining a city hospital from which a slave was negligently allowed to
escape); Brown's Adm'r. v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S. E. 707 (1890)
(maintaining a jail which burned, causing the death of a prisoner); Shaw
v. Charleston, 57 W. Va. 433, 50 S. E. 527 (1906) (the death of a child from
incarceration in an unsanitary jail); Contra: Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47
Fed. 268 (C. C., W. D. Va. 1891); Charleston v. Beller, 45 W. Va. 44, 30
S. E. 152 (1898) (prosecuting an alleged violation of a city ordinance for
which it was sought to impose costs upon the city); Bartlett v. Clarksburg,
45 W. Va. 393, 31 S. E. 918 (1898) (permitting fireworks to be set off in
a street, frightening a horse); Holsberry v. Elkins, 86 W. Va. 487, 103 S. E.
271 (1920) (permitting children to coast on a snowy sidewalk, causing a
slippery condition); Wood v. Hinton, 47 W. Va. 645, 35 S. B. 824 (1901)
(granting and subsequently revoking a permit for the erection of a carpenter
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accepted pattern. The results achieved are best explained by ap-
plying a historical test,-is the activity of a character such as
governments have usually performed? Certain theoretical
principles, however, stand out in the opinions. Thus it is con-
sidered an indication of non-governmental character that the func-
tion is sometimes performed by private corporations for profit,
and is undertaken by the municipality only under an optional
power; but, on the other hand, whether the activity actually pro-
duces, or could produce, a profit is not controlling.! Some dis-
tinction is taken on the basis of imposing responsibility for own-
ing and managing property; thus an attempt is made to divide
the city's activities into governmental and "proprietary" classes,
-an antithesis that evidently cannot be carried far." Things done
for the mere pleasure of the citizens are ordinarily not govern-
mental, but in matters of "welfare" the line is difficult to draw.
The statements of principle and the terminology employed in most
of the decisions are derived largely from Richmond v. Long's Ad-
ministratorn through Gas Company v. Wheeling." The usual at-
shop using steam machinery); Carder v. Clarksburg, 100 W. Va. 605, 131
S. E. 349 (1926) semble (grading and paving streets); Javins v. Dunbar,
110 W. Va. 271, 157 S. E. 586 (1931) semble; Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W.
Va. 233 (1886) (supplying water for fire protection, - negligenco
alleged in failing to repair main); Ritz v. Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262,
31 S. E. 993 (1898) (maintaining a reservoir for municipal water sys-
tem). But see cases infra holding that municipal water supply system is
generally not a governmental activity. Gas Co. v. Wheeling, 8 W. Va. 320
(1875) (acquiring a municipal gas plant) semble, sed quacre; Clay v. St.
Albans, 43 W. Va. 539, 27 S. E. 368 (1897) (whether to provide or omit
drains in connection with construction of streets) dictum.
The following activities of municipalities have been held to be of non-
governmental character: Wig'al v. Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S. E. 554
(1914) (operating municipal water system,-damage caused by bursting of
reservoir); Prager v. Wheeling, 91 W. Va. 597, 114 S. E. 155 (1922)
(operating municipal water works plant); Nutter v. Salem, 110 W. Va. 180,
157 S. E. 592 (1931); Gibson v. Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 18 S. E. 447
(1893) (permitting a dangerous embankmeht to stand on city-owned prop-
erty alongside road) semble; Warden v. Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S. E.
375 (1925) (maintaining shoot-the-chute in amusement park); Hyre v. Brown,
102 W. Va. 505, 135 S. E. 656 (1926) (supplying electricity from municipal
plant) semble.
The following activities of boards of education have been held to be of
governmental character: JKrutili v. Board of Education, 99 W. Va. 466, 129
S. E. 486 (1925) (maintaining a planing machine in a manual training class,
which caused injury to a pupil from an unguarded blade); Boice v. Board
of Education, 160 S. E. 566 (W. Va. 1931) (operating a bus on the high-
way for transportation of children to and from school).
ORichmond v. Long's Adm'r., supra n. 8; Wigal v. Parkersburg, supra
n. 8; Warden v. Grafton, supra n. 8.
'0 Ritz v. Wheeling, supra n. 8; Gibson v. Huntington, supra n. 8; But of.
Warden v. Grafton, supra n. 8.
1 Supra n. 8.
2Supra n. 8.
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tempt at division is between activities that are "ministerial and
specified, or assumed in consideration of privileges conferred"
and those that are "discretionary or governmental".' Some
guidance, perhaps, can be secured from language of this sort, but
no test can be devised so satisfactory as the historical approach
resting upon the traditional character of the governmental func-
tions.
The rigor of the rule forbidding suit against the state and
its agencies is considerably mitigated by permitting some
measure of judicial control over the acts of public officials by
mandamus proceedings and injunctions. It is well settled that
even state officials, as well as subordinate public officers, boards,
etc., may be required by mandamus to perform strictly ministerial
functions definitely prescribed by law, and may be prevented
by injunction from wrongful or negligent acts under claim or
color of official position or authority. As to matters of a political
character, or which involve official discretion, the reverse is true;
upon such points the action, or inaction, of public officials can-
not be controlled or coerced by the courts.' These familiar rules
bear upon our question in two ways. The injunction and
mandamus cases throw light upon the division of public activities
into the governmental and non-governmental categories, a division
that must frequently be applied in the field of public torts.
Furthermore, the power to enjoin a threatened wrongful act be-
fore its commission, or to compel the performance of a duty that
has been denied, while it affords no redress for injuries com-
mitted, does make it possible to forestall and prevent wrongs
which would otherwise be perpetrated, and thus leaves the citizen
not so devoid of remedy as he would be if obliged to wait and sue
for damages afterward.
The question has arisen several times whether and how this
governmental immunity to suit may be waived or surrendered.
Directly, or by necessary implications from statutes and munic-
ipal charters, it is usually waived in the wide field of the con-
1See Richmond v. Long's Adm'r., supra n. 8; Mendel v. Wheeling, supra
n. 8; Clay v. St. Albans, supra n. 8. But of. Gibson v. Huntington, supra
n. 8; Wigal v. Parkersburg, supra n 8
2See Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Miller, 19 W. Va. 408
(1882); Blue Jacket Consolidated Copper Company v. Scherr, supra n. 2;
Coal and Coke Railway Company v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613
(1910); State v. Shawkey, 80 W. Va. 638, 93 S. E. 759 (1917); Downs v.
Lazzelle, 102 W. Va. 663, 136 S. E. 195 (1926); Fidelity and Deposit Com-
pany v. Shaid, 103 W. Va. 432, 137 S. E. 878 (1927). The foregoing are
merely typical cases; it is beyond the scope of this article to present an
exhaustive digest of nandamus or injunction cases.
5
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tractual obligations of municipal corporations and quasi-corpora-
tions. Can it be waived by the immediate agencies of the state?
Can it be waived in respect of governmental torts? Can it be
waived indirectly or involuntarily? The cases afford a partial
answer to these questions. Thus the present workmen's compensa-
tion law, which subjects to its operation county courts and munic-
ipal corporations as employers, has extended the field of liability
of such agencies to employees injured through their negligence,
and to that extent has worked a waiver of the immunity from suit
which they formerly enjoyed in cases arising from their govern-
mental activities.' But a state board holding and managing a
hospital for the insane, by failing to subscribe to the workmen's
compensation fund, did not thereby waive its immunity to suit
for the negligent injury of an employee, although the statute ex-
pressly makes the state an employer."' And a board of education,
which was exempt from suit for negligence in connection with the
transportation of children to school, did not become liable to suit
because it voluntarily took out liability insurance covering the
operation of its vehicles.17 So far as these cases cover the field,
they seem to indicate that the direct governmental agencies of the
state cannot be subjected to liability for tort, even by reasonably
clear statutory language, and that counties and municipal corpora-
tions lose their immunity only by the operation of statutes, and
not by any voluntary recognition or admission of liability."
A second defense to governmental liability for tort arises from
a doctrine associated with the law of principal and agent. Gov-
ernments are intangible entities. They act only through human
beings. The assertion of a claim against a governmental agency
necessarily involves the contention that the defendant is charge-
able with the acts, or inaction, of a human agent. But under our
decisions the state and other governmental agencies are not
15Rader v. County Court, 94 W. Va. 493, 119 S. E. 479 (1923); Esque v.
Huntington, 104 W. Va. 110, 139 S. E. 469 (1927).
26Barber's Adm. v. Spencer Sate Hospital, supra n. 3.117 Boice v. Board of Education, supra n. 8.
'It might be supposed that the plainest statutory form of waiver of
exemption from suit would be to confer upon the governmental agency in
question the power "to sue and be sued". Certain of the early cases ap.
pear to give great weight to the use of these words in such statutes, but
recently the court seems practically to ignore them. On this compare the
following early cases: Dunnington v. Northwestern Road, supra n. 3; James
River and Kanawha Company v. Early, supra n. 3; and County Court v. Holt,
supra n. 7, with the following showing the more recent attitude; Barber's
Adm. v. Spencer State Hospital, supra n. 3; Krutili v. Board of Education,
s2pra n. 8. Upon the most acute issue,--the right to sue the State Road
Commission,--the court seems to have disregarded these words in the statute
except when an injunction was sought. See Downs v. Lazzelle, supra n. 14.
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chargeable with the wrongful or negligent conduct of their repre-
sentatives. The state can do no wrong; and whoever does wrong,
to that extent does not represent the state."
Obviously, some qualification of this principle seems neces-
sary, but it is surprising to find how nearly it has been carried
to its logical (or illogical) extreme. Elsewhere in the law one
who employs another, has control over his operations and claims
the benefit of his acts, is held also to responsibility for the negli-
gence or misconduct of the latter while acting for the employer's
benefit within the proper field of his duties. But otherwise when
a governmental agency is the employer. In such case the law
stands ready with a keen blade to pare the flaw of negligence from
the sound fruit of the agent's service, and thus permit the state
to reject whatever is evil in the activity of its representatives,
while claiming the benefit of all they do rightfully.
"If the State's agents traveled outside their lawful rights
and committed an unlawful act against respondents, they did
not represent the State and can not claim the protection of
the State against a suit for their wrongdoing. For such a
wrong the State is not liable, and such a wrong can not be
imputed to the State. Only the individuals responsible there-
for are liable, and they in their collective or individual
capacities ..... But as the State, the King, can do no wrong,
it can not be sued for a tort; a tort will not be imputed to
it; the wrongdoer in every such case is the one doing the un-
lawful act.' '
Certain minor variations appear in the presentation of this
doctrine. Thus in some cases stress is laid on the idea that those
who act for the government or its agencies are public officers, not
merely agents of the defendant. The theory seems to involve two
elements; that the agent is an autonomous power by virtue of the
public position he holds, and that the real principal is not so
much the governmental agency as the people at large.' In the
well-known case of Coal & Coke Railway Company 'v. Conley, a
striking differentiation is made between the state and its govern-
ment. The theory there presented is that the government, which
is the active and visible representative of the state, is a fallible
10 See Richmond v. Long's Adm'r., supra n. 8; Mendel v. Wheeling, supra
n. 8; Wood v. Hinton, supra n. 8; Coal and Coke Railway v. Conley, supra
n. 14; Downs v. Lazzelle, supra n. 14.
' Downs v. Lazzelle, supra n. 14.
See Bartlett v. Clarksburg, supra n. 8; Charleston v. Beller, supra n. 8;
Thomas v. Grafton, 34 W. Va. 282, 12 S. E. 478 (1890).
22 upra n. 14.
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human instrument which may do wrong; but the state itself, an
intangible, abstract concept, somewhat like the ultimate substance
discussed in Greek metaphysics, cannot be affected by the failings
of the outward and visible government.
Another variation of the rule is sometimes presented as an
application of the principle of ultra vires. The powers of counties
and municipalities, being strictly limited by statute, and no
statute having ever granted the power to commit tortious acts,
a loose and easy escape from unpleasant consequences seems to
present itself by dismissing all negligence and misconduct of pub-
lic officials as ultra vires. At bottom the principle is always
the same,-it asserts that the incidental injuries and wrongs grow-
ing out of governmental activities are no part of the activities
with which they are associated, but are the mere private trespasses
of the persons who commit them and who are alone responsible.
The doctrine applies with its full force to officials of the state
and to its boards, commissions and other agencies." It applies
to counties as governmental sub-divisions of the state.' Its
application to municipal corporations involves again the distinc-
tion between the governmental and non-governmental activities of
such bodies. The rule of respondeat superior is applied against
municipalities in the non-governmental situations, where they are
held liable to suit under the principle already discussed. The
questions of immunity from suit and liability as principal for the
torts of employees involve the same issue. Yet while both defenses
turn upon the character of the activity, they are of widely differ-
ent natures. One is a matter of remedy,-whether the defendant
can be brought into court for the enforcement of the claim; the
other involves substantive law,-whether what was done by the
human agent imposes liability upon the defendant municipality.
Yet many of the opinions mix up indiscriminately the question of
whether a city can be sued and the question of its responsibility
for the acts of its officials or employees.
13The idea is suggested in the interesting case of Brown's Adm. v. Guy-
andotte, supra n. 8. But of. Hyre v. Brown, supra n. 8; Rutherford v.
Williamson, 70 W. Va. 402, 74 S. E. 682 (1912).
2, Coal and Coke Railway v. Conley, supra n. 14; Downs v. Lazzelle, &upra
n. 14.
' Watkins v. County Court, supra n. 4; Moss Iron Works v. County Court,
89 W. Va. 367, 109 S. E. 343 (1921). But where the agents of a county
court wrongfully removed coal from certain land and the county authorities
claimed the benefit of the trespass, used the coal, and defended the claims
of their agents, the county was held to have ratified the trespass and become
chargeable with the damages. But quaere why the acts of county officials
in attempting to ratify a wrong should be any more effective to bind the
county than the act of committing the wrong. Boyer v. County Court, 92
W. Va. 424, 114 S. E. 750 (1922).
8
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As a necessary corollary from the view that no governmental
liability attaches, it would seem to follow that the individual who
has caused the wrong complained of is personally liable for the
damage incurred. If, by reason of committing the tort, he is ex-
cluded from official recognition, he should at least be liable as a
private person. Apparently the court has applied this view in
good faith in the limited number of cases where the question
arose.' Yet, in certain cases involving this individual liability,
it has been necessary to recognize that a public officer may act
tortiously in his official capacity. In actions for damages for
wrongful action, or inaction, upon official bonds of public offi-
cers, the question arises whether the wrong was committed within
the apparent scope of official duty, for otherwise the bondsman
cannot be held liable.' In these cases the court has recognized
that acts may be done in the usual course of conducting the offi-
cial business of a public office, presumably in the public interest,
which involve the commission of actionable torts. It is thus not
inherent in the nature of things that whatever is done wrongfully
in public office is unofficial and unauthorized.
So far, we have found no situations in which governmental
agencies can be held liable for torts, except in the non-govern-
mental activities of municipal corporations, but we have now to
consider the effect of certain statutory and constitutional provi-
sions which modify the principles just considered. The most
prolific source of tort cases against public authorities is the
statutory liability for damages resulting from a road, bridge,
street, or sidewalk, being out of repair. Without analyzing this
legislation in detail it is sufficient to bear in mind that the West
Virginia statutes have always imposed a general liability of this
character upon the county courts with respect to public roads
outside the limits of incorporated cities and towns, and upon
municipalities with respect to the streets and sidewalks within
23 See Clark v. Kelly, 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S. E. 365 (1926). But of. Saw-
yer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 241 (Va. 1867). The distinction is generally taken
that no personal liability attaches by reason of acts done in the exercise ofjudicial or discretionary powers, but only for failure to perform or neglect
in performing ministerial acts. Henderson v. Smith, 26 W. Va. 829 (1885).
This analysis hardly expresses the point of view necessary for our purpose.
We are only concerned with cases where a tort has been committed, and tort
liability cannot usually be deduced from a discretionary or judicial-govern-
mental power. The case cited, however, was in fact one of plain negligence
and the principle invoked by the court was probably misapplied (notary in-
correctly certifying acknowledgement of a married woman).
2
7 In fact, a rather fine distinction has arisen between wrongful acts done
under color of office and those done under color of authority; and, under
some circumstances at least, liability upon the bond requires that there should
9
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their bounds; but since the system of state highways was created
under the jurisdiction of the State Road Commission, the counties
have been relieved of liability for the state of repair of these lat-
ter highways.' An interesting preliminary question, not wholly
academic, is whether the counties or municipalities would be liable
for damages occasioned by the bad condition of roads or streets
independently of statute. It is certain that constructing and re-
pairing roads, streets and sidewalks is a governmental function,"
and it seems settled that the liability of the counties exists only by
virtue of the statute.' A county is not liable to one who cannot
invoke the statutory provision. The liability of municipalities,
however, independently of the general statute, is usually held to
depend upon whether, under the particular charter involved, the
city is given control of the streets and sidewalks, the power and
duty to repair them, and means to exercise such power and duty,
i. e., the right to levy taxes or otherwise to raise funds for the
purpose.' Under this rule, cities are usually liable for negligence
in failing to keep their streets and sidewalks in a safe condition
on the theory of an implied assumption of the duty.
But the general statute in this state imposes a liability of a
be at least some purported official warrant for what was done. See State
v. Mankin, 68 W. Va. 772, 70 S. E. 764 (1911); State v. Miller, 104 W. Va.
226, 139 S. E. 711 (1927).
0 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 9, § 33. And see the earlier legisla-
tion to the same general effect. See also Clayton v. County Court, 96 W.
Va. 333, 123 S. E. 189 (1924); Parsons v. County Court, 92 W. Va. 490,
115 S. E. 473 (1922).
29 See cases cited in n. 8, supra, and in the following note.
Watkins v. County Court, supra n. 4; Shipley v. Jefferson County, supra
n. 4; Corrigan v. Board of Commissioners, supra n. 4; Clayton v. County
Court, supra n. 28. It is obvious that no defense to this stability can be as-
serted on the ground that the defect in the thoroughfare was caused by a
governmental activity, for the very business of maintaining and repairing
streets and highways is governmental. The remarkable result follows that a
road-making vehicle in motion cannot give rise to an enforcible cause of
action against the county, for it is used in a governmental employment.
Douglass v. County Court, supra n. 4. Yet as soon as such a vehicle stops
moving, it may become an obstruction creating a dangerous condition of the
highway, for which the county could be liable. Hersman v. County Court,
86 W. Va. 96, 102 S. E. 810 (1920).
"Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323 (1882); Curry v. Mannington, 23
W. Va. 14 (1884). And where the power and means to maintain streets
and highways is conferred, a municipal corporation cannot evade liability on
the ground that no express duty is imposed by its charter, nor even by
undertaking formally to repudiate such a duty. See Cavender v. Charleston,
62 W. Va. 654, 59 S. E. 732 (1908); Waddell v. Williamson, 98 W. Va. 547,
127 S. E. 396 (1925). But for reasons of some historical validity, even if
logically unsatisfactory, boards of education are not held responsible for
negligence in the performance of duties relating to property entrusted to
their care, and as to which they have the power and duty to make repairs
and means and facilities for doing so. See Krutili v. Board of Education,
supra n. 8.
10
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different character. In contrast to the constitutional provision
later discussed, this statute creates an original affirmative liabil-
ity,-it affects rights, not merely remedies. Thus, although at
common law no liability could attach without negligence, it has
long been settled in this state, after some early decisions contra,
that the statutory liability is absolute and exists independently of
negligence. The defendant may have been as careful as could be
wished but, if despite such care, the street or road was, in fact,
out of repair, the traveler injured thereby may recover.' Again,
this liability may be imposed even though the defendant had no
notice of the existence of the dangerous condition and even if
there was only a hidden, or latent, defect, which caused the dam-
age.' The liability, moreover, grows out of the mere lack of re-
pair of the street or highway, regardless of whose act, or inaction,
caused the condition. Cities and counties are liable if private
There is probably no very serious variance in the holdings in the cases,
but it is impossible to reconcile the language of the numerous opinions. In
the following cases it seems to be clearly held that negligence is not neces-
sary in order to hold liable a county or municipality: Sheff v. Huntington,
16 W. Va. 307 (1880) ; Chapman v. Milton, 31 W. Va. 384, 7 S. E. 22 (1888) ;
Biggs v. Huntington, 32 W. Va. 55, 9 S. E. 51 (1889); Gibson v. Hunting-
ton, supra n. 8; Campbell v. Elkins, 58 W. Va. 308, 52 S. E. 220 (1906);
Burke v. County Court, 70 W. Va. 174, 73 S. E. 304 (1911); Shipley v.
Jefferson County, supra n. 4; Williams v. Coal Company, 83 W. Va. 464,
98 S. E. 511 (1919); Carder v. Clarksburg, supra n. 8; Blankenship v.
Williamson, 101 NV. Va. 199, 132 S. E. 492 (1926). In the following cases
the language of the court indicates with greater or less force the view that
negligence on the part of county or municipal authorities is an essential
element of the plaintiff's case, but a reading of the cases will indicate that
this language is probably not to be taken too seriously: Griffin v. Williams-
town, 6 W. Va. 312 (1873); Childrey v. Huntington, 34 V. Va. 457, 12 S.
E. 536 (1890); Bowen v. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 682, 14 S. E. 217 (1891);
Parrish v. Huntington, 57 W. Va. 286, 50 S. E. 419 (1906) (in this case
the court speaks both of absolute liability and of a duty to exercise due and
reasonable care, almost as though they were interchangeable expressions);
Corbin v. Huntington, 74 W. Va. 479, 82 S. E. 323 (1914); 81 W. Va. 154,
94 S. E. 38 (1917). See also Curry v. Mv[annington, supra n. 31. The fol-
lowing case seems to be an express holding that negligence is the basis of
the cause of action, but if so, is doubtless to be treated as ill considered:
Ice v. County Court, 77 W. Va. 152, 87 S. E. 75 (1915). And in a recent
case the court has again discussed the issue as one of negligence,--a surpris-
ing lapse. Silverthorn v. Chester, 106 W. Va. 613, 146 S. E. 614 (1929).
' The following cases hold or express the view that a county court or
municipality may be held liable regardless of whether it is chargeable with
notice of the existence of the defect; Sheff v. Huntington, supra n. 32;
Chapman v. Milton, stpra n. 32; Phillips v. County Court, 31 IV. Va. 477, 7
S. E. 427 (1888); Biggs v. Huntington, supra n. 32; Arthur v. Charleston, 51
W. Va. 132, 41 S. E. 171 (1902); Stanton v. Parkersburg, 66 W. Va. 393,
66 S. E. 514 (1909); Warth v. County Court, 71 W. Va. 184, 76 S. E. 420
(1912). The following case, holding that the county court or municipality
must be charged with notice, is stated in later cases to have been overruled:
Curry v. Mannington, sipra n. 31. Yet as late as 1926 the court stated again
that notice was an essential element of the cause of action. Blankenship
v. Williamson, sitpra n. 32.
11
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persons negligently, or even maliciously, cause dangerous con-
ditions in the streets or highways." The test frequently expressed
is, in substance, whether the street or road is reasonably safe for
persons using ordinary care to travel by day or night in a usual
or proper manner.'
2See Williams v. Coal Co., supra n. 32; Pollock v. Wheeling Traction Co.,
83 W. Va. 768, 99 S. E. 267 (1919).
IsThere are difficulties in classifying the cases upon what state of facts
constitutes actionable lack of repair of a street or highway, because the
court has frequently discussed that question in terms of the duty of care
imposed upon the plaintiff and the elements of causation involved in the
occurrence of the particular accident. Allowing for these factors the fol-
lowing is a rough indication of some of the most interesting holdings. The
street, highway or sidewalk was held to be out of repair within the meaning
of the statute in the following situations: Biggs v. Huntington, supra n. 32
(where a well had been dug on private property at the edge of a street)
cemble; Bowen v. Huntington, sup'ra n. 32 (where a slope or bank had been
left in a sidewalk that was being graded); Rohrbough v. Barbour County
Court, 39 W. Va. 472, 20 S. E. 565 (1894) (where the edge of a bridge ap-
proach was left without a guard rail); Arthur v. Charleston, supra n. 33
(where a rope had been tied across the sidewalk to hold a wharf boat in
time of flood); Rucker v. Huntington, 66 W. Va. 104, 66 S. E. 91 (1909)(where a large stone had been left in a street); Townley v. Huntington,
68 W. Va. 574, 70 S. B. 368 (1911) (where a trench was dug for a water
pipe in a grass plat between the roadway and sidewalk and left open several
months); Burke v. County Court, supra n. 32 (where a wooden bridge was
weakened by a latent defect); Shipley v. Jefferson County, supra n. 4 (where
a highway bridge was too weak to support a traction engine and stone crusher)
semble; Johnson v. Huntington, 80 W. Va. 178, 92 S. E. 344 (1917) 82 W. Va.
458, 95 S. E. 1044 (where a scaffold erected over a sidewalk for protection
during building operations was broken by a timber falling upon it); Hers-
man v. County Court, supra n. 30 (where a road roller was left parked on a
highway at night) semble; Waddell v. Williamson, supra n. 31 (where a ditch
was left dangerously close to the edge of a street) semble; Blankenship v.
Williamson, supra n. 32 (where a pile of dirt and lumber was placed in the
street).
The street, highway or sidewalk was held not to be out of repair within the
meaning of the statute in the following situations: Watkins v. County Court,
supra n. 4 (where a dead tree growing by the roadside fell upon a traveler) ;
Smith v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 713, 11 S. E. 1 (1890) (where a road
graded along a hillside was merely narrow); Gibson v. Huntington, supra n.
8 (where a dangerous embankment stood upon city property near the edge
of a street); Van Pelt v. Clarksburg, 42 W. Va. 218, 24 S. E. 878 (1896)
(where a deep frozen chuck hole existed in a street) ; Yeager v. Bluefield, 40
W. Va. 484, 21 S. E. 752 (1895) (where a street crossing was made slippery
by accumulation of mud in winter); Bartlett v. Clarksburg, supra n. 8 (where
fireworks were set off in a street); Hungerman v. Wheeling, 46 W. Va. 761,
34 S. E. 778 (1899) (where a bank at the edge of a street was unprotected
by a guard rail); Post v. Clarksburg, 74 W. Va. 48, 81 S. B. 562 (1914)(where a sidewalk elevator of the usual type was installed); Boyland v.
Parkersburg, 78 W. Va. 749, 90 S. E. 347 (1916) (where ice formed on a
sidewalk from water descending a downspout); Whittington's Adm'r. v.
County Court, 79 W. Va. 1, 90 S. E. 821 (1916) (where a pile of stones was
placed at the edge of a highway); Holsberry v. Elkins, upra n. 8 (where
children made a sidewalk slippery by coasting); Douglass v. County Court,
supra n. 4 (where a county truck was driven recklessly on a highway); Riley
v. Ronceverte, 108 W. Va. 222, 151 S. E. 174 (1929) (where an obstruction
was placed in the middle of the street intersection to act as a "silent police-
man ").
12
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Further, this statutory liability is peculiar in that it is for
the benefit only of a limited class,-those who traverse the road,
street or sidewalk as lawful travelers. No rights are conferred
upon one who is injured by reason of the dangerous condition of
the road if he is not a traveler. For example, a workman engaged
in road repairs cannot recover for injuries sustained because of
a dangerous excavation made in the course of other work being
done where he was employed.' And a most interesting applica-
tion of this doctrine is afforded by two cases arising from road
machines left standing in the highway. A man who drove his
car at night into a parked road roller had a cause of action, be-
cause he was a traveler injured by an obstruction in the high-
way.' But no liability arose in consequence of the death of a
child who played upon a tractor left standing in the street and
managed to start it, so that it ran downhill and caused the
fatality.' The tractor was doubtless an obstruction, and the
street was out of repair within the purview of the statute, but this
was not an injury to a traveler and did not result from the situa-
tion of the machine as an obstruction to the street. The same
accident could have happened in a field.
Even so, the statute, as construed by the court, has been the
source of innumerable judgments against counties and municipal-
ities; and at one period certainly, the court, apparently concerned
over the volume of this litigation, applied to these cases some very
stringent views upon the principles of contributory negligence
and proximate cause to preclude recovery. These matters are
outside the field of our discussion, but some of the more vigorous
holdings (superseded now by a very different attitude on the
part of the court) are listed in the footnotes.e '
3 Corrigan v. Board of Commissioners, supra n. 4.
Hersman v. County Court, supra n. 30.
13 Carder v. Clarksburg, supra n. 8.
31 See Phillips v. County Court, supra n. 33; Hesser v. Grafton, 33 W. Va.
548, 11 S. E. 211 (1890); Waggener v. Point Pleasant, 42 W. Va. 798, 26
S. B. 352 (1896); Van Pelt v. Clarksburg, supra n. 35; Slaughter v. Hunting-
ton, 64 W. Va. 237, 61 S. E. 155 (1909). For some interesting distinctions
in matters of proximate and remote causation, see Smith v. County Court,
supra n. 35; Rohrbough v. County Court, supra n. 35; Hungerman v. Wheel-
ing, supra n. 35; Rucker v. Huntington, supra n. 35. Another obstacle for-
merly placed in the path of the plaintiff in these cases was a requirement
of proving by municipal records the public character of the street involved.
Childrey v. Huntington, supra n. 32; Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26
S. E. 266 (1896). But this has long since been changed. The public char-
acter may be established by evidence that municipal authorities recognized
the street by improving or repairing it. See Phillips v. Huntington, 35 W.
Va. 406, 14 S. E. 17 (1891); Campbell v. Elkins, supra n. 32; Warth v.
County Cout, supra n. 33; Burke v. County Court, supra n. 32; Williams v.
13
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A more sweeping modification of the fundamental principles
previously considered flows from the constitutional provision that
private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." The general purpose of this pro-
vision is to provide for and require condemnation of property
rights under the power of eminent domain, and superficially it
might appear that this is its entire effect. But, in fact, this pro-
vision has created a whole system of tort liabilities for damage to
property, involving principles remote from the field of con-
demnation.
The first requirement of the section, that property shall not
be taken for public use without compensation, has been made
operative by the familiar condemnation statutes. But the legisla-
ture has never implemented by statute that part of the clause re-
lating to property which is merely damaged.' It might well be
supposed, and apparently was once contended, that this part of
the constitutional provision merely enlarged the scope of what
should be covered by condemnation proceedings,-that it broad-
ened the field of the property and rights that must be purchased
and paid for when used for public purposes. Such a construction
would require that the public authorities should acquire by em-
inent domain a right akin to an easement to damage the prop-
erty, and that they should be responsible only by condemnation
proceedings to restore to the property owner such permanent
value as is taken away.
It has long been settled, however, that the constitutional pro-
vision has a more far reaching effect. It requires governmental
agencies to answer in damages for torts committed to private
property on terms wholly inconsistent with any theory of con-
demnation or purchase. Although no statute can be invoked, the
constitutional provision is self-executing and the remedy is an
ordinary action on the case for trespass or negligence. Oddly
enough, however, under the terms of the constitution, the plaintiff
has the right to demand a jury of freeholders; and this, historically
Coal Company, supra n. 32. And see Chapman v. Milton, supra n. 32; Zirtle
v. Elkins, 93 W. Va. 39, 115 S. E. 875 (1923). For the best general sum-
mary of the principles applied in this class of cases, see Williams v. Coal
Company, supra n. 32.
10W. Va. Const., art. 3, § 9.
"See White v. Charleston, 98 W. Va. 143, 126 S. E. 705 (1925).
aJohnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402 (1880); Thorne v. Clarksburg,
88 W. Va. 251, 106 S. E. 644 (1921); Martin and Shaffer v. Martinsburg,
102 W. Va. 138, 134 S. B. 745 (1926).
14
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the procedure in condemnation only, is here invoked to try an
ordinary damage suit.'
The operation of this clause of the constitution cuts sharply
across the whole field of governmental liability heretofore dis-
cussed. The court has frequently stated that it operates only to
remove the immunity to suit which flows from the exercise of
governmental powers. It is held to allow a remedy otherwise
denied, although it seems to speak solely in terms of substantive
right. Furthermore, the judicial construction is that no substan-
tive right is created: on the contrary, the plaintiff can invoke
only such rights as would exist independently of the constitutional
provision."
One fundamental defect in the application of this theory
seems not to have troubled the court. In governmental matters,
as we have seen, wrongful or negligent conduct on the part of
public officials is not imputed to a governmental agency,--
respondeat superior does not apply. Now, although the court
holds that no substantive right is created by this constitutional
provision, it finds that the governmental master is responsible
for the negligence or misconduct of the governmental servant
whenever the constitutional liability is invoked. The rigid fiction
that the wrongful acts are those only of the agent could easily
be here applied by ruling that no public use is subserved when
private property is wrongfully damaged. Such a view would
limit the operation of the constitutional provision to cases where
the damage is necessary and rightful from the governmental
standpoint, and such cases are doubtless the majority. It seems
clear, however, that the court has gone beyond this and has im-
posed liability for acts of an ordinary tortious character growing
out of governmental operations to the detriment of private prop-
erty rights."
The pardonable uncertainty in the early cases upon the ques-
13 Thorne v. Clarksburg, supra n. 42.
"See Jordan v. Benwood, supra n. 39; Tracewell v. County Court, 58 W.
Va. 283, 52 S. E. 185 (1906). In contrast with the statutory liability for
bad repair of streets and highways the governmental agency is liable here
only for its own negligence, not for the acts or omissions of strangers. See
Mason v. Bluefield, 105 IV. Va. 209, 141 S. E. 782 (1928).
'M any of the cases cited here upon this topic seem to support this con-
clusion; but for a particularly clear and recent decision to this effect, see
Javins v. Dunbar, supra n. S. The tort in that case was damage to the
plaintiff's dwelling from smoke and vibration caused by the unloading of
paving materials. The city defended on the ground that the paving was a
governmental function, but the court held that the property was tortiously
damaged for the public use, although the injury seems sufficiently indirect
and avoidable.
15
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tion whether this constitutional provision relates to eminent do-
main or tort liability has been reflected in coidfusion over the
measure of damages to be applied. The court, at one period,
seems to have believed that compensation could be awarded only
for a permanent depreciation in the value of the property af-
fected, corresponding to the idea that some fraction of the value
had been appropriated by the public authorities and must be paid
for, as though in consequence of a forced purchase. In accordance
with this idea, it was held that the measure of damages must
necessarily be the difference in market value of the property be-
fore and after the damage was committed." But this theory has
long gone by the board. It is settled that the constitutional pro-
vision may be invoked to cover temporary and transitory damage
to property, as well as damage of a permanent nature; and the
plaintiff is to be compensated in the one case by the usual rules
for making good what he has suffered, and, in the other case, by
the measure of the permanent depreciation in the property
value.'7
The theory expressed by the court as to the operation of this
constitutional provision would seem to give little ground for dis-
tinction between the right to sue an official or agency of the state
itself, and the similar right against a county or municipal cor-
poration in the governmental aspect of the latter. If immunity
to suit depends upon whether the defendant represents the state
and partakes of its sovereign character, a waiver of this restriction
might well apply equally to a governmental agency of any class
or rank (subject to such limitations as are imposed by the con-
stitutional prohibition against making the state a defendant).
The court seems never to have wrestled with this point in any
explicit way, but the decisions draw the usual line of demarkation
between state agencies on the one hand and counties and sub-
ordinate bodies on the other. In practical effect the constitutional
provision removes the barrier to actions against counties, munic-
ipal corporations and other governmental agencies of no higher
grade, but leaves all state officials and agencies still beyond the
power of the courts.'
" McCray v. Fairmont, 46 W. Va. 442, 33 S. E. 245 (1899); and see Blair
v. Charleston, 43 W. Va. 62, 26 S. E. 341 (1896).
17 Tracewell v. County Court, supra n. 44; McHenry v. Parkersburg, 66 W.
Va. 533, 66 S. E. 750 (1910); Mason v. Bluefield, supra n. 44. See Holt v.
Weston, 110 W. Va. 184, 157 S. E. 176 (1931).43This seems to follow without escape from the rule established by Mahone
v. State Road Commission, supra n. 3, that the commission, as a direct agency
of the state, cannot be sued for damages committed against private prop-
16
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The State Road Commission in recent years has had to bear
the brunt of most of the attempts to enforce liability for tort
against state agencies. To a large extent these attacks have been
turned aside and directed against the county courts under the
statutory provision requiring the latter to pay for all necessary
rights and easements required by the state road commission."
After an early period of hesitancy, the court held that this lan-
guage made the county courts liable for incidental damage done
to property in constructing state highways.' Apparently, the
full effect of claims that might be asserted under the constitution-
al provision was to be allowed against the counties. One excep-
tion has been made, however, which makes it difficult to under-
stand the court's reasoning. Only damages of a permanent char-
acter may be recovered against the county courts, and, for transi-
tory and temporary damage, the property owner is left remedi-
less,' yet, as already mentioned, the constitution, as interpreted
by the court, requires that compensation be made for damage of
the latter character. If committed by the county's own agents,
the county would have to pay. When committed by the State Road
Commission the county escapes, apparently because temporary
damage is not covered by the statutory language requiring the
counties to pay for "necessary rights and easements"; and no
action has been permitted to be maintained against the State Road
Commission, despite the court's view that the constitutional pro-
vision waives exemption from suit.'
erty for public use. Such an action would be a suit against the state. Yet,
according to Downs v. Lazzelle, supra n. 14, the commission or its agents
may be enjoined from wrongfully damaging property and the result is con-
sidered to be authorized, at least in part, by the statutory language giving
the commission power to "sue and be sued". A state agency of this sort, it
is said, may thus be controlled "where no affirmative relief is sought",--
thus excluding actions for damages. Some further elucidation of the court's
tlieory is badly needed.
0 W. VA. Rv. Com, (1931) c. 17, art. 4, § 4.
'See Mahone v. State Road Commission, supra n. 3; Kinney v. County
Court- 110 W. Va. 17, 156 S. E. 748 (1931); Lambert v. County Court, supra
n. 3; Carden v. County Court, 110 W. Va. 195, 157 S. E. 411 (1931).
aCarden v. County Court, supra n. 50.
0 And where the commission itself condemns property at the expense of
the county court, the owner cannot be compensated for tortious damage com-
mitted in the construction of the highway, State Road Commission v. Moss,
108 W. Va. 267, 150 S. E. 722 (1929). The effect of this statute is thus to
be limited apparently to the eminent domain-purchase theory of compensa-
tion in contrast with the broad scope of the constitutional provision already
discussed. For tortious damage property owners have a right created by the
constitution which cannot be enforced against the commission for lack of a
remedy, nor against the county courts because of the narrow construction
of the statute fixing the liability of the latter. The only redress seems to be
by action against the contractor or employee who committed the injury.
17
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This section of the constitution protects only private prop-
erty and thus, in effect, creates a privileged class of claims based
on damage to property, while governmental torts against the per-
son are left without redress. The cases present many interesting
variations in the type of facts from which the claims arise, but
nearly all fall into three principal classes, (a) cases of damage
from grading and constructing highways, (b) cases of damage
from changing the elevation of street grades in cities, and (c)
cases of damage from interference with drainage and water
courses, usually in connection with street or highway work.'
The actual operation of the principle just discussed produces
consequences that reflect little credit upon the law as a social
agency. The citizen is obliged by law to entrust the safety and
welfare of his children during the helpless years of their lives to
the care of boards of education and their employees. If such a
board of education, in the course of grading a school lot raises
or lowers the surface of the ground a few feet, the court will com-
pel it to pay the adjoining land owner the damage, however
trifling, he may have sustained." Yet, if such a board of educa-
tion by the negligence of its employees injures or kills a child
while transporting it in the school bus, or provides a dangerous
machine which maims a child who is compelled to operate it in
a manual training course, the law affords no redress.' These are
actual cases, not theoretical assumptions.
There is need of a critical revision of the rules now controlling
in this field of the law to achieve more just and intelligent prac-
tical results. A really detailed and critical survey will reveal
many more inconsistencies in the legal theory and unsatisfactory
results of its operation than can here be discussed. The whole
subject should be overhauled and scanned in the light of utilitarian
principles. Obviously we need first an intelligent restatement of
fundamentals, followed by carefully drawn legislation to modern-
ize and harmonize the present somewhat antiquated conceptions.
The ground work must be a study of the rules now applied by the
court, a task whereof the foregoing is submitted as a modest be-
ginning.
"The cases are numerous and reasonably accessible through the digests;
they throw little light upon ultimate questions of liability. Those of any
special significance have already been cited and it seems needless to collect
the others.
Lindamood v. Board of Education, 92 W. Va. 387, 114 S. E. 800 (1922).
"Krutili v. Board of Education, supra n. 8; Boice v. Board of Education,
supra n. 8.
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